I am much further along in the book written by Robert Gates, our former Secretary of Defense, and there is nothing that changes my opinion from the previous posting. It is still an excellent work, and although many will be lost in the details of wrangling a defense budget, the point is more about the process. It also serves as a reminder that defense spending is really just the juggling of 100 glass balls while being blindfolded on bouncing on a pogo stick. The entire process requires more than a small dose of prescience about future issues, problems, and developments, and it is then fraught with political issues to further muddy the waters. The key is that to plan for the future, one must also figure out the threats of the future, and then come up with a plan to deal with those threats.
The Department of Defense is often criticized, just as the War Department and Navy Department were until the late 1940s, and in essence this boiled down to their monolithic lack of clairvoyant abilities. The tendency to plan for the last war is often pointed out as the real problem, but people forget that sometimes the only frame of reference is history. By necessity, anyone exposed to this process will realize that it will require a delicate balance between the needs of the “here and now” and the far more ethereal “tomorrow.” Sure, some things you know about the future, for example, a certain ship type or aircraft has a shelf life that will expire after a number of years. Even with extensions, and other magic applied to both a weapon system and a budget, there are just some things that wear out. Meanwhile, other things can’t be guessed at, such as advances in technology in communications, computers, missile systems, etc. These things change rapidly, and when they do, you need to be flexible enough to make those upgrades. Then there are the unexpected events, and in Secretary Gates’ book, you get a real feel for this process when we had to upgrade and develop things to protect individuals in combat from certain new threats in both Afghanistan and Iraq. For anyone ever involved in this process, you have my deepest respect, and a hearty “Thank GOD” that I never had to get involved in it personally. After all, I wouldn’t do well with either a pogo stick or a blindfold. ~ Michael S. Pauley
The Department of Defense is often criticized, just as the War Department and Navy Department were until the late 1940s, and in essence this boiled down to their monolithic lack of clairvoyant abilities. The tendency to plan for the last war is often pointed out as the real problem, but people forget that sometimes the only frame of reference is history. By necessity, anyone exposed to this process will realize that it will require a delicate balance between the needs of the “here and now” and the far more ethereal “tomorrow.” Sure, some things you know about the future, for example, a certain ship type or aircraft has a shelf life that will expire after a number of years. Even with extensions, and other magic applied to both a weapon system and a budget, there are just some things that wear out. Meanwhile, other things can’t be guessed at, such as advances in technology in communications, computers, missile systems, etc. These things change rapidly, and when they do, you need to be flexible enough to make those upgrades. Then there are the unexpected events, and in Secretary Gates’ book, you get a real feel for this process when we had to upgrade and develop things to protect individuals in combat from certain new threats in both Afghanistan and Iraq. For anyone ever involved in this process, you have my deepest respect, and a hearty “Thank GOD” that I never had to get involved in it personally. After all, I wouldn’t do well with either a pogo stick or a blindfold. ~ Michael S. Pauley
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